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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING * 
AND HEATING, * Priority No. 15 
* 
Plaintiff/Appellee, * No. 20001009 - CA 
vs. * Trial Court Case: 
* 940300014CN 
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN * 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah corporation, * 
Defendants/Appellants. * 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)0)and Utah R. App. P. Rules 3 and 4. Pursuant to §78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, the Utah 
Supreme Court transferred this matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE: After ruling that the mechanics' lien claimant was not entitled to a judgment of 
foreclosure with respect to its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien, the trial court committed error when it 
failed to comply with the statutory mandate contained in §38-1-18 U.C. A. and declined to award the 
successful party their reasonable attorneys fees. As the "successful party" in this lien foreclosure 
action, the Defendants, (the homeowner and general contractor respectively) submit that as a matter 
of law they were entitled to an award of their reasonable attorney fees pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C. A., 
particularly in light of the express instructions of the Court of Appeals in the prior appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The interpretation of a statute poses a question of law which 
this court reviews for correctness and without deference to the lower court's conclusions." Zoll and 
Branch, P. C. v. Asav. 932 P.2d 592, 593 (Utah 1997). The Appellants believe the foregoing issue 
1 
primarily challenges the trial court's conclusions of law, which an appellate court would accord no 
particular deference, but review for correctness. "[W]hether attorney fees are recoverable in an action 
is a question of law, which we review for correctness." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 
(Utah 1998); Soft Solutions, Inc. v. Brigham Young University, 1 P.3d 1095, (Utah 2000); "Whether 
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review for correctness." A.K. 
& R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518, cert, denied, 994P.2d 1271 (Utah 
1999). 
CITATION TO RECORD WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED: Defendants' Memorandum of 
Points and Authority in Support of Defendants' Request for Attorney Fees filed November 2,1999, 
Record 1975; Notice of Appeal filed November 17, 2000, Record 2050. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE 
Utah Code §38-1-18: 
§ 38-1-18. Attorneys' fees. Except as provided in Section 38-11-107, in any action 
brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed 
as costs in the action. Amended by Laws 1961, c. 76; Laws 1995, c. 172, § 4, eff. 
May 1, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from the final judgment (on remand from 
the Utah Court of Appeals) of the Third District Court, Summit County, which denied the Plaintiffs 
claim for relief of foreclosure of its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien,1 entered a judgment against Whipple 
in the amount of $527.00, but declined to award the Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred 
1
 See Addendum " 1 " - Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien filed September 14, 1993. 
2 
in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure action, which fees the Defendants had requested 
pursuant to §38-1-18 Utah Code Annotated. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW: 
Following an appeal (first appeal) by the Defendants (homeowner and general contractor), the 
Utah Court of Appeals entered an order remanding the matter to the trial court for disposition 
consistent with its opinion. A. K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 
P.2d 518, 527 (Utah App. 1999). After remand, the trial court held a telephone conference with the 
attorneys and set deadlines to submit memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Utah 
Court of Appeals for resolution by the trial court. The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 
1999, at which time the trial court heard arguments and took evidence (by way of affidavit) as to the 
reasonable attorney fees incurred by the parties. On January 20, 2000, the trial court entered its 
Memorandum Decision as to the remaining issues - Record 2022.2 The trial court denied Whipple's 
claim for relief of foreclosure of its $30,647.20 mechanics' lien, and entered a judgment in favor of the 
homeowner and general contractor and against the Plaintiff in the amount of $527.00. 
Notwithstanding Whipple's failure to obtain an order of foreclosure of its mechanics' lien, the trial 
court declined to award the Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully 
defending against the foreclosure, which the Defendants had requested pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C. A. 
Sometime in September 2000, Whipple's attorney submitted Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order of Foreclosure as directed by the trial court in the 
Memorandum Decision. The trial court signed the amended pleadings which were filed with the clerk 
2
 There are actually two memorandum decisions in the record: one dated January 12,2000 (Record 2015), and 
one dated January 20,2000 (Record 2022). Except for the dates they are otherwise identical. Because the January 20, 
2000 decision is the only decision which the Defendant's attorney received, this decision is referenced. The other 
decision was first discovered around April 11, 2001, after reviewing the record and finalizing this brief. 
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of the court on October 18, 2000. On November 17, 2000, the Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal 
in relationship to the trial court's failure to award the Defendants their reasonable attorney fees 
incurred in successfully defending against the lien foreclosure proceeding in this action. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS: For purposes of this appeal the Defendants respectfully 
submit the following as being relevant for this appeal3: 
1. On March 18, 1999, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order remanding this matter to 
the trial court for disposition of the matter consistent with its opinion stating: 
T[ 31 The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in any action brought to enforce any 
lien under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled to recover reasonable 
attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). In this case, although the trial court initially 
granted Aspen's motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien 
claim because of improper licensure, it went on to award Whipple the value of the 
work performed on Aspen's property. Based in part on this finding, the trial court 
concluded that Whipple was the prevailing party and entitled to an award of attorney 
fees. However, this conclusion may be erroneous in light of our determination that 
section 58-55-604 precludes Whipple from recovering for its HVAC work. Based 
upon our review of the record, it appears the HVAC claim was the single most 
important issue in this case and Aspen, having fully prevailed on the HVAC claim in 
this appeal, may now be entitled to prevailing party status under section 38-1-18. If 
on remand the trial court determines Aspen is the prevailing party under section 
38-1-18, then Aspen must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding 
attorney fees incurred in pursuing its claim. We therefore remand this issue to the 
trial court for a redetermination of the attorney fees award consistent with this 
opinion and the entry of findings necessary to support the revised award. 
[Emphasis supplied by the Appellant.] (p. 525) A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Aspen Constr.. 977P.2d518, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
Shortly after the remand, the trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys and set 
deadlines to submit memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Court of Appeals for 
resolution by the trial court. (Telephone Conference with Judge Noel held September 13, 1999.) 
3
 A detailed summary of the underlying facts in this case are set forth fully in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Aspen Const., 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999), a copy of which is included as Appendix "5 ." 
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2. On November 2,1999, the Defendants submitted their Memorandum of Law and Affidavit 
of Attorneys Fees which detailed the dates the work was performed, the hourly rate, the time spent, 
and described in detail the nature of the services performed. Additionally, the Defendants' attorney 
allocated the fees between: (1) the successful claims for which there may have been entitlement to 
fees; (2) the unsuccessful claims for which there would have been a claim for fees had the claims been 
successful; and (3) the claims for which there would be no entitlement to attorney fees. (Defendants' 
Attorney's Affidavit - Record 1975) 
3. The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 1999, in Salt Lake City. The court heard 
arguments and took evidence from the Defendants' attorney (by way of affidavit) as to the reasonable 
attorney fees incurred by the Defendants. Whipple's attorney argued at the hearing that he could not 
allocate the fees, but after the hearing submitted his affidavit supporting his claim for attorney fees. 
(Record 2062, Transcript of Hearing, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 10,1999; Letter and Affidavit 
of Plaintiff s Attorney filed November 12,1999 - two days following the hearing; see also Defendants' 
Objection to the late submission filed November 17, 1999.) 
4. On January 20, 2000, the trial court entered its memorandum decision as to the remaining 
issues. The trial court denied Whipple's claim for relief of foreclosure of the $30,647.20 mechanics' 
lien and entered a judgment against Whipple in the amount of $527.00. (Record 2022) The initial 
appeal and subsequent remand involved three (3) separate lien foreclosure matters which were 
consolidated for trial.4 The trial court held for Whipple on the other two (2) lien foreclosure matters, 
determined the lien amounts ($631.00 and $1,666.00 respectively), found Whipple to be the 
4
 The three lien foreclosure actions which were consolidated for purposes of trial are referenced hereinafter 
for the convenience of the Court as: (1) the Dianne Quinn lien; (2) the Tom Guy Poolhouse lien; and (3) the Thaynes 
Canyon property lien. 
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"successful party" with respect to those liens, determined reasonable attorney fees related to those lien 
foreclosure matters, and entered orders foreclosing the other two parcels of property respectively. 
(Record 2022) (Those judgments of foreclosure have subsequently been paid and satisfied by Aspen 
Construction.) 
5. Notwithstanding Whipple's failure to obtain an order of foreclosure of its $30,647.20 
mechanics' lien in this matter (the Thaynes Canyon property), the trial court declined to award the 
Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the foreclosure, 
which the Defendants had requested pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C. A. (Record 2022) 
6. In September 2000, the Plaintiff submitted Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and an Amended Order in accordance with the trial court's January 20, 2000, Memorandum 
Decision. These were subsequently signed by the trial court and were later entered by the clerk on 
October 18,2000. (Record 2029) On November 17, 2000, the Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal 
in relationship to the trial court's failure to award the Defendants their attorney fees incurred in 
successfully defending against the lien foreclosure proceeding. No cross appeal has been filed by the 
Plaintiff. (Record 2050) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is little dispute that the legal and factual issues surrounding the lien foreclosure of the 
Thaynes Canyon property were the primary focus of both parties' efforts expended at trial. The 
Plaintiff, a licensed plumbing contractor, but an un-licensed HVAC contractor, asserted that it could 
legally claim and foreclose a $30,647.20 mechanics lien for both plumbing and HVAC work. (See 
6 
Addendum 1 (Notice of Claim of Lien) and Addendum 2 (Whipple's trial exhibit #12 - Summary 
of Whipple's lien claims.) Although the HVAC claim was the single most important issue in the 
case (as to which the Court of Appeals held the Defendants had fully prevailed) it was not the only 
issue on which the Defendants prevailed. In addition to defending against Whipple's HVAC claim, 
the Defendants successfully defended against Whipple's claim for labor and equipment in installing 
french drains ($3,162.05), relocating a municipal water line ($6,660.80), and backhoe rental 
($780.00.) The Defendants also successfully prevailed on their counterclaim that the HVAC System 
was defective. The trial court granted the Defendants a $7,000.00 offset for deficiencies it found 
in the HVAC system as well as a $2,000.00 offset to finish the plumbing work. All these issues 
arose during the trial in addition to the issue the Defendants prevailed upon during the first appeal 
concerning Whipple's lack of an HVAC license.5 
The trial court erred when it held that these issues were not "inextricably related" to the 
overall defense of Whipple's lien claim. When the trial court entered a monetary judgment against 
Whipple (effectively denying the $30,647.20 lien claim) the Defendants attained "successful party" 
status as a matter of law; the trial court's refusal to grant them their reasonable attorneys fees 
5
 At trial Whipple vigorously pursued its $30,647.20 lien claim. Whipple's trial exhibit #12 (Addendum 2) 
clearly shows that Whipple sought (net of Aspen's $17,000 payments which were properly credited against the 
Thaynes Canyon property) approximately $30,441.35 plus the costs of filing the Notice of Claim of Lien. Whipple's 
lien claim against the Thaynes Canyon property was composed of the following items and amounts: 
Item Claimed - 77 Thaynes Canyon Amount 
Laterals (sewer) $10,000.00 
Municipal Water Re-location $ 6,660.80 
French Drains $ 3,162.05 
Backhoe $ 780.00 
Plumbing $13,358.00 
Heating $12,265.50 
Gas Piping $ 1,015.00 
Subtotal $47,441.35 
Less Payments <$17,000.00> 
Total Claim $30,441.35 
7 
related to defeating Whipple's lien claim was error as a matter of law. The trial court's award of 
attorney fees to the Plaintiff on the two mechanics' liens that it prevailed on, and denial to the 
Defendants on the mechanics' lien claim they prevailed on, is logically and legally inconsistent and 
mandates reversal and remand to another trial judge for a fair and impartial determination of the 
reasonable attorney fees the Defendants are entitled to, including fees related to this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
AFTER RULING THAT WHIPPLE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER ANY 
SUM ON THE $30,647.20 MECHANICS' LIEN, THE TRIAL COURT 
COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO AWARD THE DEFENDANTS, 
THE "SUCCESSFUL PARTY" IN THE LIEN FORECLOSURE ACTION, THEIR 
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES AS COSTS OF THE ACTION AS REQUHIED 
UNDER §38-1-18 U.C.A. 
Following the remand, the trial court held a hearing and subsequently entered a 
Memorandum Decision regarding all three of the lien foreclosure cases which were consolidated for 
purposes of trial.6 At the hearing, the Defendants argued that application of \21 and ffi[30-34 of the 
Court of Appeals' opinion required a factual and legal determination by the trial court that the 
Defendants were the "successful party" with respect to the litigation involving the Thaynes Canyon 
property, and consequently were entitled to their reasonable attorney fees in defending against that 
lien foreclosure matter. 
A. Evidentiary Basis. 
Prior to the hearing, the Defendants' attorney submitted his affidavit which was prepared 
to comply with the requirements articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 
52 (Utah 1998). Citing the Foote v. Clark decision in [^32, the Utah Court of Appeals stated the 
following: 
6
 See footnote 4. 
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The party must differentiate between the fees and time expended for "(1) successful 
claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful 
claims for which there would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had the 
claims been successful, and (3) claims for which there is no entitlement for attorney 
fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). This 
requirement also obligates the trial court to make findings which closely resemble 
the requesting party's allocation of fees on each claim. See Foote, 962 P.2d at 55. 
Finally, the trial court must clearly identify and document the factors it considered 
dispositive in calculating the award. See id. Absent such an allocation and 
documentation, this court cannot adequately review the trial court's decision. See id. 
at 57. 
Based upon the foregoing standard, the Defendants' attorney made the following allocations 
of attorney fees: 
Category 1: $30,902.89 
Category 2: 4,531.00 
Category 3: 1.000.00 
Total Fees Incurred: $36.433.89 
(See Affidavit of Defendants' counsel paragraphs 5 & 6 filed November 2, 1999 - Record 1975.) 
The inclusion of the majority of the fees in Category 1 was due exclusively to the fact that 
the defense of Whipple's $30,647.20 mechanics' lien claim (which was itself comprised of several 
different components - see Addendum 2) required proof of and counter proofs on the several 
different claims: (1) proof by the Defendants as to whether the HVAC system was defective and 
therefore added no value to the property; (2) whether Whipple's lack of an HVAC license estopped 
him from being able to pursue foreclosure as a matter of law; and (3) whether Aspen owed Whipple 
for services it had not contracted or requested regarding the installation of french drains, the 
relocation of the municipal water line and payment for the use of a backhoe left by Whipple at the 
construction site. The mechanics' lien claimant must prove that he has enhanced the value of the 
property; conversely, if the Defendants could prove the HVAC system was deficient, then the lien 
9 
claimant has not enhanced the property. At trial, the Defendants were successful in convincing the 
trial court that at least $7,000.00 of repairs were needed to remedy the negligent HVAC installation 
as well as a $2,000 offset for the unfinished plumbing work. (See Record 262) By successfully 
prosecuting the appeal on the HVAC issue (which the Court of Appeals observed was the "single 
most important issue in the case"), the Defendants defeated the lien claim and the trial court found 
that the Defendants were entitled to a monetary judgment of $527.00. However, this Court should 
not lose sight of the fact that had the Defendants prevailed only on the HVAC issue, Defendants 
would noi be the "successful party " in this case. In order to be successful the Defendants had to 
prevail (and they did prevail) on several issues. (See Whipple's lien claims summarized in footnote 
4 and Addendum "2." 
B. What Constitutes a "Successful Party"? 
§38-1-18 U.C.A., 1953 provides in pertinent part as follows 
. . . in any action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter the successful party shall 
be entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, which shall be 
taxed as costs in the action. (Emphasis supplied by Defendants) 
The issue before the trial court was simply whether the Defendants were the "successful party" 
in the lien foreclosure action involving the Thaynes Canyon property. Following the hearing, the 
trial court found Whipple to be the successful party with respect to the mechanics' lien on the Diane 
Quinn property as well as the mechanics' lien on the Tom Guy Pool house property, and awarded 
fees to the Plaintiff in connection with those two lien foreclosure matters as to which no appeal or 
cross appeal has been taken. Regarding the lien filed against the Thaynes Canyon property the trial 
court determined the Defendants to be the successful party and found they were entitled to a 
monetary judgment against Whipple in the amount of $527.00 (effectively denying the Plaintiffs 
$30,647,20 lien foreclosure claim). The Defendants respectfully submit that the denial of the right 
10 
to foreclose the mechanics' lien resulted, as a matter of law, in the Defendants being the "successful 
party" as to the foreclosure action filed against the Thaynes Canyon property. Notwithstanding, 
the trial court declined to award the Defendants any attorney fees setting forth in the Memorandum 
Decision two reasons: 1) The Defendants had just barely prevailed in the lien foreclosure action 
involving the Thaynes Canyon property; and 2) The Defendants "prevailed on an essentially legal 
issue." 
1. "The Defendants Did Not Just Barely Prevail" The first reason articulated by the trial 
court was that the Defendants had just barely prevailed. The trial court in explaining its reasoning 
stated the following: 
It is important to the Court to note however that defendant [sic] is such only by 
the amount of $527.00. The Court feels where Plaintiff was claiming roughly 
$13,000.00 on the Thayne's Canyon property (allowing for the $17,000.00 
already paid), and where Defendant was claiming $25,000.00 in damages for the 
negligence of the plaintiff, and further where the net recovery is only $527.00, the 
Court is of the opinion that this is essentially a "draw" and no attorney's fees 
should be awarded. The Appellate Courts in our state have acknowledged that the 
"net recovery rule" is essentially a starting point and need not be applied strictly 
under circumstances. 
The trial court's reference to only the $ 13,000.00 plumbing claim (as if the plumbing work was 
the only claim Whipple was pursuing against the Thaynes Canyon property) is not only factually 
incorrect7 but it misapplies the legal standard by which the Utah courts determine which party in 
a lien foreclosure action is the "successful party." It is understandable that given the fact that this 
case has been in litigation for over six years, the trial court may have been confused when it 
referenced only the $13,000.00 plumbing claim, but this amount was only part of the total amount 
7
 Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien contained a demand for $30,647.20 plus costs of filing. The lien was 
comprised of the following items and amounts: Sewer laterals $ 10,000; Municipal Water Relocation $ 6,660.80; French 
Drains $ 3,162.05; Backhoe Rental $780.00; Plumbing $13,358.00; Heating $12,265.50; Gas Piping $ 1,015.00; 
Subtotal $47,441.35 less payments $17,000.00; Total Claim $30,441.35. See Addendums " 1 " and " 2." 
11 
Whipple was seeking on its mechanics' lien. See Addendums 1 (Notice of Claim of Lien); 2 
(Whipple's trial exhibit 12) and 3 (trial court's Minute Entry following trial, Record 262.) In 
essence, the trial court holds that defeating a mechanics' lien claim by only a small amount is not 
enough to allow a Defendant to claim successful party status. This is error. The Defendants fully 
prevailed against Whipple's assertion of a $30,647.20 mechanics' lien. It is respectfully submitted 
that the trial court incorrectly applied the law. Had the Defendants failed to recover any sum but 
still prevented Whipple from obtaining an order allowing foreclosure of its lien, they would, 
pursuant to §38-1-18 U.C.A., be the f<successful party and ergo, entitled to their reasonable 
attorneys 'fees. 
An examination of the case law regarding what constitutes a "successful party" reveals the 
application of a simple two-part test: First, the courts look to the complaint in the underlying action. 
If the complaint (or a counterclaim arising out of the underlying action) involves the enforcement 
of a mechanics' lien, then reasonable attorneys' fees shall be awarded to the party who was 
successful. Second, "success" is determined solely by whether or not the party asserting the right 
to enforce the lien was successful. You either are or are not successful in obtaining lien foreclosure. 
The concept is one that is mutually exclusive. Petty Inv. Co. v. Miller, 576 P.2d 883 (Utah 1978); 
Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297, 452 P.2d 325 (1969); Rotta v. Hawk, 756 P.2d 713 
(Utah App. 1988).8 
8
 In fairness to the trial court another point of confusion may have been caused by dicta included in the Court 
of Appeals prior decision. See A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const.. 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999), 
a copy of which is included as Appendix "5 ." In footnote 1, the Court of Appeals states: "On remand, the trial court may 
find helpful the guidance offered on this issue by Mountain States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551,555-58 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989)." The reference to Mountain States is misleading because Mountain States involved a contracts clause 
allowing recovery of attorney fees to the prevailing party, not the application of Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. and while the 
Mountain States case may be helpful, in light of the clear authority defining what constitutes a "successful party" 
Mountain States could not be dispositive of the issue in this or any other lien foreclosure case. 
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Application of the correct legal standard in this case clearly mandates a conclusion, as a matter 
of law, that the Defendants were the "successful party" as to the $30,647.20 lien foreclosure action 
involving the Thaynes Canyon property. 
2. The Defendants Did Not Merely Prevail on a "Legal Issue." 
The trial court went on to explain an additional reason as to why it was denying any attorney 
fees: 
Moreover, the Court thinks there is an additional reason to award no fees. The 
only reason that the defendant received a net recovery, is because it prevailed on 
an essentially legal issue, that is that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a contractors 
license prevented him from collecting on an equitable basis for the installation of 
the HVAC. This issue was clearly distinct and separate from the defendants 
negligence claim. The Court does not feel that they are "inextricably tied 
together" as urged by the defendant. Had the defendant not prevailed on this legal 
issue concerning the plaintiffs Licensure, then plaintiff would have obtained a 
net recovery of approximately $8,646.00. The Court therefore is of the opinion 
that the defendant [sic] should have allocated attorney fees to the mechanics lien 
claim of plaintiff and the time expended litigating the Licensure issues but has 
failed to do so. 
Without attempting to demean the trial court's reasoning, it appears to the Defendants that the 
trial court's reasoning does not give any effect to the specific instructions of the Court of Appeals 
and discounts the Defendants' status as a successful party because they merely prevailed on a "legal 
issue" (evidently as opposed to an "equitable" or "moral" issue.) The trial court's observation that 
"had the defendant [sic] not prevailed on this legal issue. . ." Whipple would have recovered 
$8,646.00, while mathematically correct, misapplies the legal standard enacted by the legislature. 
On its face §38-1-18 U.C.A. does not distinguish between the methodology one utilizes to be the 
successful party, instead the legal determination that attorney fees shall be awarded is based soley 
on whether one is or is not successful in relationship with their lien foreclosure claim. The trial 
court's analysis leads it to the incorrect result because it fails to fully analyze the entirety of the 
$30,647.20 lien claim made by Whipple. The trial court focuses instead on just the $13,000.00 
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plumbing claim as opposed to the $30,647.20 in claims it asserted in the Notice of Lien Claim 
asserted against the Thaynes Canyon property. 
Conversely, the trial court could have observed that had the Defendants not been successful in 
proving their counterclaims (the $7000.00 offset for the deficiencies in the HVAC system and 
$2,000.00 offset to finish the plumbing contract, which sums were found by the trial court to be 
proper offsets - Record 262) then the Plaintiff would have recovered $8,473.00.9 Both suppositions 
are of little relevance, however, because they only analyze a portion of Whipple's claims comprising 
its $30,647.20 lien. As the above statements prove, reliance upon only a partial analysis of 
Whipple's lien claims and the defenses to those claims creates a logical fallacy which in turn leads 
one to arrive at the incorrect conclusion. The Defendants prevailed not simply because they were 
successful in one aspect of their defense, as the trial court implies, but because they were successful 
on several fronts. A review of the trial court's decision after the trial (Record 262) discloses that 
with respect to the Thaynes Canyon property the Defendants were successful on the following 
issues: 
$6,660.80 - Relocation of the Park City water line for which Whipple sought 
and was denied recovery of $6,660.80. Compare Plaintiffs Exhibit 12 with 
trial court's decision. (Record 262) 
$3,162.05 - French drains. Whipple sought and was denied recovery of 
$3,162.05 for installation of french drains. Compare Plaintiffs Exhibit 12 
with trial court's decision. (Record 262) 
$680.00- Backhoe rental. Whipple sought recovery of $780.00. Whipple 
was only granted relief for $100.00. Compare Plaintiffs Exhibit 12 with 
trial court's decision. (Record 262) 
9
 $8,646.00 less. $9,173.00 (the HVAC amount the Plaintiff was not allowed to recover for lack of an HVAC 
license) plus $7,000.00 and $2,000.00 (the offsets found by the trial court on the Defendants' counterclaim). 
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$2,000.00 - Offset for finish work related to plumbing contract Whipple 
sought $13,358.00, but recovered $11,358.00. (Record 262) 
$7,000.00 - Offset for deficiencies in the HVAC system. Whipple 
contended there were no offsets due because there were no deficiencies. The 
trial court granted the Defendants an offset of $7,000.00 due to the 
deficiencies found by the trial court in the HVAC system. (Record 262) 
$12,265.00 - HVAC contract. Whipple sought and was denied recovery of 
$12,265.50 for the HVAC system. Compare Plaintiffs Exhibit 12 and trial 
court's original decision (Record 262) with result required by application of 
the Court of Appeals' decision on the first appeal. 
In this context, one can see the fallacy of the trial court's logic. As a matter of law, the 
Defendants were the "successful party" in the litigation surrounding the Thaynes Canyon property, 
and they are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. The issues surrounding the lien foreclosure 
action involving the Thaynes Canyon property were " inextricably tied together." 
This legal principal was discussed in First General Services v. Perkins. 918 P.2d 480 (Utah 
App. 1996) and reaffirmed in Brown v. David K. Richards & Co.. 978 P.2d 470, (Utah App. 1999). 
In Brown, the Utah Court of Appeals stated the following: 
1f 19 We have awarded fees to a prevailing party even though some of the fees may 
not have been incurred on strictly compensable issues, because proof of the 
compensable and non-compensable claims overlapped. For example, in First 
General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480 (Utah Ct.App.1996), a subcontractor 
sought to foreclose a mechanics' lien against a homeowner, and the homeowner 
counterclaimed alleging negligent workmanship. See id. at 483. The subcontractor 
prevailed and sought recovery of its fees incurred in both the foreclosure of its lien 
and defense to the homeowner's counterclaim. See id. The trial court awarded fees 
on the foreclosure claim, but refused to award fees under the mechanics' lien statute 
for defense against the homeowner's counterclaim. See id. 
f 20 On appeal, we reversed, holding that the subcontractor was entitled to fees both 
in pursuing its affirmative claims and defending against the counterclaim because the 
two were inextricably tied together. See id. at 486. In so holding, we recognized that 
where the proof of a compensable claim and otherwise non-compensable claim are 
closely related and require proof of the same facts, a successful party is entitled to 
recover its fees incurred in proving all of the related facts. See id. 
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In Tf 22 of the Brown v. Richards case, the Court of Appeals held that "Richards's defense under 
the Asset Sale Agreement (i.e., Richards's defense that Brown failed to substantially perform) had 
a common factual basis with his breach of warranty and his negligent and fraudulent 
misrepresentation claims." The Court of Appeals further stated that: "[W]here Richards's attorneys' 
efforts went to prove facts common to both recoverable contract and non-recoverable fraud claims, 
the fees were recoverable." 
Like the First General Services case, the fees incurred by the Defendants were incurred by the 
homeowner and general contractor in pursuing its affirmative claims and defending against the lien 
foreclosure claim; and like the situation in First General Services, the "successful party" should not 
be denied the right to recover their reasonable attorney fees because the two were inextricably tied 
together. The Appellant would respectfully request that the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court 
as it did in First General Services for essentially the same reasons set forth in that opinion. 
C. Attorney Fees Incurred on Appeal: 
The Defendants argued to the trial court that Utah case law required the trial court to include 
the attorneys' fees Aspen had incurred on appeal since "An appeal from a suit brought to enforce 
a [mechanics'] lien qualifies as part of'an action' for the purpose of section 38-1-18." J. V. Hatch 
Const., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 15 (Utah App. 1998) citing Richards v. Security Pac. Nat'l 
Bank, 849 P.2d 606, 612 (Utah App. 1993). Note: Richards, supra was cited with approval in 
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895 (Utah 1996).10 
10
 See also footnote 7 at page 196 American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Comm. Corp., 939 P.2d 185 
(Utah App. 1997) which states: 
FN7. Although, as Cellcom suggests, there may not technically have been any prevailing or 
successful party in the prior appeal, in determining who is entitled to attorney fees under section 38-1 -
18, we look to which party was ultimately successful. See Stunkel v. Gazebo Landscaping Design, 
Inc., 660 So.2d 623, 627 (Fla.1995). This court did not decide the merits of any claims in the prior 
appeal, and thus it could not be determined who was the successful party for purposes of the 
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CONCLUSION 
The Defendants respectfully submit that the trial court's decision which denied them an award 
of their reasonable attorneys' fees was clear error. Defendants were the "successful party" on the 
mechanics' lien claim made by Whipple against the Thaynes Canyon property, and they are entitled 
to be awarded their reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection therewith. §38-1-18 U.C. A. The 
case should be remanded to the District Court with orders to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to 
what fees were incurred below and on this appeal with respect to all aspects of the Thaynes Canyon 
property. Given that this is Judge Noel's second ruling which the Defendants have had to appeal, 
the Defendants respectfully request the matter be remanded to another judge. 
The appellate courts of this state are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring legal accuracy 
and uniformity of the laws of this state. Willev v. Willey. 951 P.2d 226 (Utah 1997) 
The trial court's denial of attorney fees was error. It compounded this error when it ignored the 
multiple claims that the Defendants had prevailed on and focused solely on the "legal issue" on 
which it was reversed (and directed by the Court of Appeals that the Defendants had prevailed on). 
It compounded its error when it ruled that the issues involved in defending the Plaintiffs lien claim 
and the defenses and offsets to the $30, 647.20 lien claim were not inextricably tied to each other. 
The trial court's reasons for denying the Defendants' request for their reasonable attorney fees, 
mechanics' lien statute until the trial court made its ruling on remand and until this appeal was 
resolved. 
Moreover, Syscom was forced to defend in the prior appeal to "enforce" its liens, and thus Syscom 
is entitled to its attorney fees incurred in defending its lien claims on appeal. Cf. First Gen. Servs. 
v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480,486 (Utah.Ct. App. 1996) (holding "the successful defense of counterclaims 
which would otherwise defeat the principal lien claim, in whole or in part, must necessarily be 
considered for the purpose of awarding attorney fees under the mechanics' lien statute"). 
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because they merely prevailed on a "legal issue," or because they only prevailed by $527.00 failed 
to address or apply the correct legal standard. Throughout the trial and on appeal, the Defendants 
constantly challenged the Plaintiffs ability to assert a lien against the Thaynes Canyon property and 
did so for multiple reasons. Whipple did not prevail; nonetheless, Whipple caused the Defendants 
to incur substantial fees for which a remedy under Section 38-1-18 U.C.A. is mandated. When 
Whipple failed to obtain an Order of Foreclosure on its $30,647.20 lien claim, it subjected itself to 
the foregoing legislative provision which the trial court was obligated to follow. 
It is immaterial by what amount the Defendants prevailed. The core inquiry is simply on 
whether Whipple was successful in pursuing its lien claim. Whipple was not successful. 
Conversely, the Defendants were successful in preventing the foreclosure of Whipple's $30,647.20 
lien. As a consequence of Whipple's failure to obtain an order allowing foreclosure of the claimed 
lien, the Defendants, as the successful party, are entitled to their reasonable attorney fees. §38-1-18 
U.C.A. The trial court has effectively disregarded not only the prior decision of the Court of 
Appeals in this case (and the Court of Appeal's express instructions to award the Defendants their 
reasonable attorney fees, if on remand the trial court determined that Whipple was not entitled to 
recover a sum on its lien foreclosure claim), but has also disregarded the legislative mandate of §38-
1-18 U.C.A. 
The Court of Appeals should reverse and remand the case with instructions to award the 
Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending the Thaynes Canyon mechanics' lien 
claim at trial as well as for all appeals. 
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Respectfully submitted t h i s / / day of April, 2001. 
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A.K.& R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING & HTG. 
#47 SOUTH 1000 WEST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84104 
(801) 359-7141 
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ALAN SPRIGGS, SUMMT COUNTY RECORDER 
1??3 SEP H 11:30 AH FEE tlG.QO BY I 
REQUESTS INTERtlQUHTAIN LIEN SERVICES 
NOTICE OF CLAIM OF LIEN 
"Mechanic's Lien" 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN by INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, the under-
signed acting as the duly authorized agent of A.K.& R. WHIPPLE 
PLUMBING AND HEATING, "lien claimant". Said agent hereby gives 
notice of the intention of said claimant to hold and claim a 
mechanic's lien and right of claim against bond, by virtue and in 
accordance with the provisions of Sections 38-1-3 et. seq., and 
14-1-13 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. That said 
lien is against the property and improvements thereon owned or 
reputed to be owned by THOMAS D. GUY. Said property is located at 
77 Thaynes Canyon Drive, Park City, Summit County, Utah. 
Legal Description: Parcel #TH8-l 
All of Lot 1, THAYNES CANYON SUBDIVISION #8, according to the 
official plat thereof as filed in the office of the Summit County 
Recorder, Coalville City, Utah. 
The lien claimant was employed by and did provide labor and/or 
materials (H.V.A.C.) at the request of ASPEN CONSTRUCTION for the 
benefit and improvement of said real property. That first labor or 
materials were provided on April 27, 1993 and the last said labor 
and/or materials were provided on August 1, 1993. That there is 
due and owing to said claimant the sum of Thirty Thousand Six 
Hundred Forty-seven dollars and Twenty cents ($30,647.20), together 
with interest, costs of $100.00 and attorney fees, if applicable; 
all for which the lien claimant holds and claims this lien. 
INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, 
Agent for the liejyclaimant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) ss. 
On September 9, 1993, personally appeared before me Anthony L. 
Scarborough, doing business as INTERMOUNTAIN LIEN SERVICES, the 
Company that executed the above and foregoing instrument as agent 
for the lien claimant, and that said instrument was signed in 
behalf of said Company and that said Anthony L. Scarborough 
acknowledged to me that said Company executed the same. 
IN WITNESS HEREOF, I have herein set my hand and affixed my seal. 
My Commission Expires: 
August 9, 1997 ublic," residing in 
e City, Utah. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
KELLY CASSELL 
taoocMft tat torn 
My Comiri«lon foptrfu Aug.», 199; 
_ KTATfcOnjTAH I 
INTERMOURfXnrZJENSZKriCES, P.O.Box 6065, S.L.C..UT. RAiso-tnxc 
Ordar- Mnoo-r 
P.O. BOX 526065 
Salt Lake City, UT 84152-6065 
(801) 486-6672 - Fax 466-2155 
September 17, 1993 
CERTIFIED NO. P 301 439 460 
Thomas D. Guy 
P.O. Box 680728 
Park City, UT 84060 
Re: Lien Against: 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive, Park City, UT 
Lien Claimant: A.K.&R- Whipple Plumbing, Salt Lake City, UT 
Contracting Party: Aspen Construction, Salt Lake City, UT 
Gentlemen/Ladies: 
Please be advised, that the attached Mechanic!s Lien has been filed 
at the request of the aforesaid MLien Claimant". The Lien is 
intended to secure for the payment of work, equipment or materials 
provided for the improvement of your property and establishes legal 
rights granted to a contractor or supplier, pursuant to Utah State 
Statutes. 
This Mechanic's Lien will be released from the County Records upon 
payment of all monies due to the claimant. If the obligation is 
not paid, they reserve the right to take further action to enforce 
their right of lien or claim against bond. 
However, it is the claimants preference that litigation be avoided. 
We believe that all parties would be best served if you would 
prevail upon the contracting party to promptly satisfy this 
account. Alternatively, you may wish to pay the claimant directly. 
Your acknowledgement and future correspondence should be made 
directly to the claimant. Please contact Kent Whipple of A.K.&R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating at (801) 359-7141, as all matters 
regarding this debt are handled by them. Thank you. 
ALS/kc 
enclosure 
cc: A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating 
Aspen Construction 
File 
Tab 2 
JOB ORDER 
JOB DESCRIPTION AMOUNTS 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
10) 
U) 
Laterals 
Thomas Guy Poolhouse 
Diane Quinn Sump Pump 
Municipal Water Re-location 
French Drains 77 Thaynes 
Backhoe 77 Thaynes Canyon Dr. 
Pool House Miscellaneous 
Diane Quinn Gas Line 
77 Thaynes House Plumbing 
77 Thaynes House Heating 
77 Thaynes House Gas Piping 
$10,200.00 
$ 1,665.92 
$ 1,100.00 
$ 6,660.80 
$ 3,162.05 
$ 780.00 
$ 65.00 
$ 631.00 
$13,358.00 
$12,265.50 
$ 1.015.00 
TOTAL $50,968.27 
LEINS AMOUNTS 
1) 77 Thaynes Canyon Drive 
2) Diane Quinn Residence 
3) Thomas Guy Pool House 
$30,647.20 
$ 631.00 
$ 1.695.92 
TOTAL LIENS $32,974.12 
TOTAL JOBS 
LESS PAYMENTS 
PRINCIPLE BALANCE DUE 
$ 7,000.00 
$ 7,000.00 
$ 3.000.00 
$50,968.27 
$33,968.27 
\ EXHIBIT 
Tab 3 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A K & R WHIPPLE PLUMBING AND H 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
GUY, THOMAS D 
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 940300014 CN 
DATE 11/30/95 X 
HONORABLE FRANK G NOEL v 
COURT REPORTER WALTON, HAL 
COURT CLERK JDO 
TYPE OF HEARING: NON JURY TRIAL 
PRESENT: PLAINTIFF DEFENDANT 
P. ATTY. WALL, STEVEN B 
D. ATTY. CHAMBERS, JOSEPH 
COURT'S RULING: 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Whipple v. Aspen Construction 
As a preliminary matter the court has reviewed Judge Brian's order carefully and is of 
the opinion that he intended that Whipple be compensated, on an equitable basis, for the work 
done and benefit conferred on the premises, with adjustments for Aspen's costs to finish the 
work and to correct any work that needed correcting. The matter has been prepared for trial 
and tried to the court with mat understanding. 
At closing argument counsel for Aspen argued that Whipple had not met the threshold 
requirement of establishing mechanics liens. However it is the courts recollection that there 
was oral evidence that liens had been filed, to which there was no objection, and in addition 
the case was tried over a four and one-half day period without any objections to any of the 
evidence of Whipple's claimed damages on the basis of no mechanic's liens. The court is 
going to allow the claims of Whipple to stand. 
Turning to the merits of the claims of the parties, the court finds and rules as; follows: 
• That the work performed by Whipple installing laterals from the curb to the house 
was not included in the written contracts between the parties for the plumbing work and 
awards Whipple $3,200 for that work. 
• That Whipple is owed $1,666 for work performed on the Tom Guy pool house. 
• That on the issue of the relocation of the Park City irrigation line the testimony of 
Kevin Monson is the more credible and accordingly awards Whipple nothing for that work. 
• That Aspen's testimony as to the french drain the more credible and awards Whipple 
nothing for that claim. 
• The court awards Whipple $100 for use of the backhoe. 
• The court awards Whipple $631 for the Quinn gas line. 
• That Whipple is entitled to $13,000 on its plumbing contract plus $1,158 for extras. 
• That Aspen is entitled to a $2000 offset on the plumbing contract for costs; to finish. 
• That Whipple, in equity is entitled to $9,173 on its heating contract with Aspen. 
($12,265 less $3,092 for Aspen's costs to finish.) 
• The court is of the opinion that Aspen has shown by a preponderance of the 
evidence that there are deficiencies in the heating system. (Leakage and poor air flow to one 
room as well as no ducts to a portion of the basement in the area of the wet bar.) Aspen has 
failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence, however, that it will be necessary to 
completely remove the existing system and install a new system. Aspen has also failed to 
show that the 3 furnaces currently installed are inadequate or that the ducting into and out of 
said furnaces is improperly sized. Mr. Neely's testimony on this issue was vague at best. 
The ducting at the furnaces meets Uniform Mechanical Code requirements. It has not been 
shown to the satisfaction of the court that any specifications or recommendations of the 
manufacturer have not been met The evidence of a higher industry standard was vague and 
not convincing to the court 
The court is further of the opinion that many of the problems may be addressed with 
further adjustments and fine tuning of the system such as complete installation of thermostats 
as designed by Whipple, connecting and operating of zone dampers etc. However, some work 
will need to be done to correct the deficiencies mentioned by the court and for that die court 
awards Aspen $7,000. 
• That Whipple is entitled to $1,015 for gas line installation. 
• That Whipple has already been paid $17,000. 
The court, therefore calculates the amount due and owing Whipple to be $3,943. 
The court is of the opinion that neither party has clearly prevailed and therefore will 
award no attorney's fees. 
Counsel for Aspen is to prepare more detailed findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
a judgement consistent with this ruling and submit them in the proper manner for the courtj^ nmu si
^
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Certificate of Mailing 
I certify that on the isf day of Dec* 1195 , 
I sent by first class mail a true and correct copy of the 
attached document to the following: 
STEVEN B WALL 
Atty for Plaintiff 
SUITE 800 
BOSTON BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
JOSEPH CHAMBERS 
Atty for Defendant 
31 FEDERAL AVENUE 
LOGAN UT 84321 
District Court Clerk 
By: C W J). (QlHpA 
1/ U Deputy Clerk 
Tab 4 
F i L E D 
!AM 2 h 2000 
Third District Court 
Deputy Clerk, 8umrrm c ^ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SUwmtT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A K 16 R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING & : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
HEATING 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO.940300014CN 
APPEALS NO: 970580-CA 
i is: : 
THOMAS D GUY 6 ASPEN CONSTRUCTION 
Defendant' 'i : 
"T'hjs mutter is before the Court on, remand from the Utah 
Court of Appeals with instructions to determine the prevailing 
pJ i i t""!i in . , in light of their ruling, and to determine an 
allocation •* attorney's fees to the prevailing party. 
Thru Cuni» !" linn t eu,3C iVOLI liilufa nf f niav i t n has heard oral 
argument, and having taken the matter under advisement now rules 
as follows: 
The Court first observes that the attorney1 s fees in this 
case on both sides seems excessively high. Plainti f f i ID i f i ally 
claimed approximately $30,000.00 in contractual damages, but has 
admitted throughout that defendant would be entitled to a 
$3 3 000 00 credit for amounts paid 
-*34t 2022 
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on the contracts. Defendant on the other hand claims roughly 
$25,000.00 in damages in based on plaintiff's negligence. If the 
claims for all three properties are considered together, then 
after the trial courts findings and the Court of Appeals ruling 
there would be a net recovery to plaintiff of approximately 
$1,770.00. Each attorney has billed in excess of $30,000.00 in 
attorneys fees. While the Court realises that the issues were 
rather varied and complex in this matter, the Court does not feel 
that the case was so oomplex as to justify the awarding of 
attorney's fees in that amount to either party. 
Both parties have submitted affidavits which allocate 
attorney's fees to the three different mechanics liens that are 
the subject matter of the lawsuit. That is the Guy pool house 
property, the Diane Quinn property, and the Thayne's canyon 
property. Plaintiff, howeverf urges the Court to consider all of 
the properties together rather than individually, in which case 
the plaintiff would have a net recovery in this matter of 
$1i770.00. Defendant asks the Court to separate the claims and 
treat them individually, in which case defendant claims a net 
recovery on the Thayne's canyon property and concedes a net 
recovery in favor of plaintiff on the Guy pool house and Quinn 
properties, but argues as to those properties that the claims 
were undisputed. It is clear that the primary dispute in this 
4-34-rr 
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case arose from the Thayne's canyon property However, the Court 
points out that while the defendant says the Guy pool house .11 id 
Quinn property claims were not disputed, neither did the 
defendant pay those claims prior to trial, and indeed when 
tttempted to introduce supplemental evidence regarding 
the filinc 1 - : the mailing of the notice of the lien 
1 ex t:ii es , the defendant vigorously 
opposed the introduction of that supplemental evidence. 
I inn ft mi i \ rivtiiiiil iiiiiiiiliijiii 111 II, I l" hm , i i c i i n i B i n i i cne i ' j I l i t! C o u r t h a s 
elected to t.real. the three properties individually, The Court 
does so for the reas c 1 " 1, f J 11,1 n ii!l: ie, 1: ,. a 3! 31 i 11 11 a , i < I a :t : 1, cioi'11 the Guy 
pool house and Quinn properties were indeed a minor part of • 
case, and they should not be relied upon \a support, HI I • 11.11 in r 1 11 
significant amount of attorneys fees which were largely incurred 
on a separate matter, i.e., the Thayne'a canyon prope -\ 
which the plaintiff di d not prevail. 
Plaintiff allocates $11,250.00 in attorneys fees to the pool 
limine pioperty and a like amount to the Quinn property. 
Plaintiff clearly prevailed on those claims Defendant on the 
other Land iilJm a1 e& only %] /HI <'H of. 1 \ 1 attorneys fees to the 
Quinn property, and $2,250.00 the pool house property. The 
Court has M'^I I^WM' •l»«» «i '" *J . the 
complexity of t:he 1 001100 involving in hhn*e claims, and finds 
<*#&• 20?A 
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that a reasonable amount of attorneys fees for the prosecution of 
those claima would be $2,000.00 ao to each claim for a total of 
$4,000.00 on those claims in favor of plaintiff. 
The Court now turns to the Thayne's canyon property. As to 
the contract claims only, the Court at trial awarded plaintiff 
$32,646.00 which included the following; 
1. Water and aewer 
laterals from curb to house $3,200.00 
2. Plumbing($14,158.00 
less $2,000 for offsets) $12,158.00 
3. Gas line $1,015.00 
4. Baokhoe $100.00 
5. Water and sewer 
laterals from the street to the curb $7,000.00 
6. HVAC $12,265.00 contract price less 
$3,092.00 to finish $9,173.00 
TOTAL: $32,646.00 
AMOUNT PAID BY DEFENDANTS: - $17,000.00 
Offset for damages based on deficient 
work - $7,000.00 
TOTAL: $8,646.00 
Less contract price per Court of Appeals - $9,173.00 
GRAND TOTAL: ($ 527.00) 
Under a strict application of "Net Recovery Rule" defendant 
would be the prevailing party on the Thayne's canyon property. 
It is important to the Court to note however that defendant is 
such only by the amount of $527.00. The Court feels where 
J
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plaintiff WHIM I i « i m i i in «i| i irmiqlj i v Vi i I'Hhi 0^ on the Thayne' s canyon, 
property (allowing for the $17,00C 00 already paid), and where 
defendant waa c damages for the negligence 
of the plaintiff, and further where the net recovery is only 
$527.00, the Court is of tlif nplnt'ii " !•»" linn . I'I nnsentiaJly a 
"draw" and no attorney's fees should be awarded. The Appellate 
Courts xn our state have acknowledged tha t the "net r ei i:::ou er y 
rule" is essentially a starting point and need not be applied 
strictly under all circumstances. 
Moreover, the Court thinks there ' s an additional reason to 
award no leM The only reason that the defendant received J HI 
I fin, I ivei v" ''ni i necause it prevailed on an essentially legal issue, 
that is that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a contractors 
ffrom collecting on an equitable basis for 
the installation the HVAC. This issue was clearly distinct 
and separate negligence claim The Court 
does not feel that they are ^inextricably tied together" as urged 
by the defendant. Haul l he defendant mil (n «vn i I ed on this 1 eg-
issue concerning the plaintiff's Licensure, then plaintiff would 
have obtained a net recovery of nppt OK tma' « I v ''" llhl'*1" n0. The 
Court therefore is of the opinion that the defendant should have 
allocated attorney fees to the mechanics .lien claim of plaintiff 
and *> fc-ime expended litigating the Licensure issues but has 
*&£ 
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failed to do so. 
Accordingly, the Court awards no attornays fees on the 
Thayne's oanyon property/ and a total of $4,000.00 in favor or 
plaintiff on the Thomas Guy pool house and Diana Quinn 
properties. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate Order. 
Dated this (^(p Dav of JANUARY, 2000: 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION, postage, prepaid, to the following, 
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Steven B. Wall 
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5200 South Highland Drive, #300 
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Joseph M. Chambers 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING AND 
HEATING, Plaintiff, Appellee, 
and Cross-appellant, 
v. 
ASPEN CONSTRUCTION, Thomas D. Guy, Claire 
B. Guy, and Diane 
M. Quinn, Defendants, Appellant, and Cross-
appellees. 
No. 971580-CA. 
March 18, 1999. 
Rehearing Denied April 8, 1999. 
Subcontractor brought actions against general 
contractor to foreclose mechanics' liens on three 
properties on which it had provided heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) and 
plumbing work. Consolidating actions, the Third 
District Court, Coalville Department, Pat B. Brian 
and Frank G. Noel, JJ., entered judgment in favor of 
subcontractor, including an award of attorney fees. 
General contractor appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Wilkins, P.J., held that: (1) subcontractor could not 
recover for HVAC work because it was not licensed 
to perform such work; (2) granting of subcontractor's 
motion to reopen action to take additional evidence 
was not abuse of discretion; (3) general contractor did 
not adequately marshal evidence in support of 
challenged factual findings, precluding consideration 
of those findings on appeal; (4) remand was required 
to determine whether general contractor was 
prevailing party and thus entided to attorney fees; (5) 
denial of general contractors motion to dismiss action 
based on subcontractor's noncompliance with 
scheduling order was not abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
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Copyright (c) West Group 2001 
. Aspen Const., (Utah App. 1999) Page 1 
30k842(l) In General. 
Court of Appeals reviews trial court's interpretation 
of a statute for correctness, without deference to the 
trial court's conclusions. 
[2] Appeal and Error ®^977(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k976 New Trial or Rehearing 
30k977 In General 
30k977(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] Appeal and Error @=*982(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k982 Vacating Judgment or Order 
30k982(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[2] New Trial <®=»6 
275 ~ -
2751 Nature and Scope of Remedy 
275k6 Discretion of Court. 
Consideration of a motion to grant a new trial or 
open a judgment for additional evidence is a matter 
left to the discretion of the trial judge, and that 
decision will be reversed only if the judge has abused 
that discretion by acting unreasonably. Rules 
Civ.Proc.,Rule59. 
[3] Appeal and Error <@=*842(2) 
30 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(2) Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
[See headnote text below] 
[3] Appeal and Error <s^ > 1008.1(5) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
977 P.2d 518, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Const., (Utah App. 1999) Page 2 
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court 
30kl008 Conclusiveness in General 
30kl008.1 In General 
30kl008.1(5) Clearly Erroneous Findings. 
Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's findings 
of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions for 
correctness. 
[4] Appeal and Error <®^842(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[4] Costs ®^208 
102 — 
1Q2IX Taxation 
102k208 Duties and Proceedings of Taxing 
Officer. 
Whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action 
is a question of law, which Court of Appeals reviews 
for correctness. 
[5] Appeal and Error ®=*969 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(H) Discretion of Lower Court 
30k969 Conduct of Trial or Hearing in General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[5] Trial ®^18 
388 — 
388III Course and Conduct of Trial in General 
388kl8 Regulation in General. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in managing the 
cases before them, and Court of Appeals will not 
interfere with their decisions absent an abuse of 
discretion. 
[6] Licenses <@^39.43(1) 
238 — 
2381 For Occupations and Privileges 
238k39.43 Contractors 
238k39.43(l) In General. 
Subcontractor that was not licensed to perform 
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) 
work could not recover for such work in actions 
against general contractor to foreclose on mechanics' 
liens; in addition to general statutory bar arising from 
lack of licensure, none of the common-law exceptions 
applied so as to permit recovery under principles of 
equity. U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 et seq., 58-55-604. 
[7] Appeal and Error <@^854(1) 
30 -— 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k851 Theory and Grounds of Decision of 
Lower Court 
30k854 Reasons for Decision 
30k854(l) In General. 
Court of Appeals has obligation to affirm the trial 
court on any available basis. 
[8] Licenses ®^39.43(1) 
238 
2381 For Occupations and Privileges 
238k39.43 Contractors 
238k39.43(l) In General. 
Common law exceptions to general statutory bar 
against recovery by unlicensed contractors are 
premised on the theory that rigid insistence on proper 
licensure is unnecessary as long as the public is 
otherwise protected from the harm the statute is 
designed to prevent. U.C.A. 1953,58-55-604. 
[9] Licenses ®=>39.43(1) 
238 
2381 For Occupations and Privileges 
238k39.43 Contractors 
238k39.43(l) In General. 
Unlicensed contractors may recover for quantum 
meruit in four instances: where the party for whom 
the work is done possesses skill or expertise in the 
field; where the work performed was siq>ervised by a 
licensed contractor; where the reason for failing to 
obtain licensure is minor and does not undermine 
ability to perform work, or where party for whom 
work is performed has not relied on unlicensed 
contractor's representations that it was licensed and 
contractor has posted a performance bond. U.C.A. 
1953, 58-55-604. 
[10] Trial <S=>66 
388 
388IV Reception of Evidence 
388IV(B) Order of Proof, Rebuttal, and 
Reopening Case 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
977 P.2d 518, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Const., (Utah App. 1999) Page 3 
388k65 Reopening Case for Further Evidence 
388k66 In General. 
Granting of subcontractor's motion to reopen action 
against general contractor in the interests of justice to 
take additional evidence regarding subcontractor's 
compliance with mechanics' lien foreclosure statute 
was not abuse of discretion; documents sought to be 
introduced were exhibits to subcontractor's complaint 
that was served on general contractor to commence 
action, and thus nothing unexpected was allowed into 
evidence. U.C.A. 1953, 38--1-1 et seq. 
[11] Mechanics' Liens <@=*309 
257 — 
257X1 Enforcement 
257k309 Review. 
In contesting trial court's *518 ultimate 
conclusions regarding subcontractor's compliance 
with mechanic's lien statute and the value of its 
plumbing work, general contractor was required to 
show either that the conclusions were incorrect given 
the findings or that the factual findings underlying the 
trial court's determinations were clearly erroneous. 
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 et seq. 
[12] Appeal and Error @=>1012.1(4) 
30 —-
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(I)3 Findings of Court 
30kl012 Against Weight of Evidence 
30kl012.1 In General 
30kl012.1(4) Clearly, Plainly, or Palpably 
Contrary. 
To challenge the trial court's factual findings, 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
[13] Mechanics' Liens <S=*309 
257 — 
257X1 Enforcement 
257k309 Review. 
General contractor did not adequately marshal 
evidence in support of trial court's findings 
concerning subcontractor's compliance with 
mechanics' lien statute and the value of 
subcontractor's plumbing work, and therefore those 
findings would not be disturbed on appeal; general 
contractor's brief disregarded evidence that supported 
challenged findings while reiterating facts favorable to 
its position, and evidence contained in addendum to 
appellate brief was not organized to show its 
relationship to particular findings but was merely a 
catalogue of all testimony in the record. U.C.A. 
1953, 38-1-1 et seq. 
[14] Appeal and Error ®=>1178(1) 
30 — 
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause 
30XVII(D) Reversal 
30kl 178 Ordering New Trial, and Directing 
Further Proceedings in Lower Court 
30kl 178(1) In General. 
Remand was required to determine whether general 
contractor was the prevailing party, and thus entitled 
to attorney fees, in action by subcontractor to 
foreclose mechanics' liens, where subcontractor was 
improperly allowed to recover for heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) work for 
which it lacked proper licensure, and HVAC claim 
appeared to be single most important issue in case. 
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq., 38-1-18, 58-55-604. 
[15] Mechanics' Liens <@=*310(1) 
257 
257X1 Enforcement 
257k310 Fees and Costs 
257k310(l) In General. 
In awarding attorney fees to subcontractor in its 
action to foreclose mechanics' liens, trial court was 
required to distinguish between work that was subject 
to a fee award and work that was not and to detail the 
factors it considered in computing the award. 
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq., 38-1-18. 
[16] Costs <®^198 
102 
102IX Taxation 
102kl98 Form and Requisites of Application in 
General. 
Party that requests attorney fees must differentiate 
between the fees and time expended for (1) successful 
claims for which there may be an entidement to 
attorney fees, (2) unsuccessful claims for which there 
would have been an entitlement to attorney fees had 
the claims been successful, and (3) claims for which 
there is no entidement for attorney fees. 
[17] Costs ®^208 
102 -— 
102IX Taxation 
102k208 Duties and Proceedings of Taxing 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
977 P.2d 518, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Const., (Utah App. 1999) Page 4 
Officer. 
In awarding attorney fees, trial court must make 
findings which closely resemble the requesting party's 
allocation of fees on each claim. 
[18] Costs ® ^ 198 
102 — 
102IX Taxation 
102kl98 Form and Requisites of Application in 
General. 
Party's failure to apportion requested attorney fees, 
so as to differentiate between work that is subject to a 
fee award and work that is not, is a sufficient basis 
for the trial court to deny fee request. 
[19] Mechanics' Liens ®^284 
257 -— 
257X1 Enforcement 
257k284 Dismissal Before Hearing. 
Denial of general contractor's motion to dismiss 
subcontractor's action to foreclose mechanics' liens, 
following subcontractor's failure to comply with 
scheduling order concerning disclosure of witnesses, 
was not abuse of discretion, where subcontractor's 
responses to interrogatories specified the witnesses it 
intended to call, thus giving general contractor the 
information it needed in order to prepare adequately 
for trial. U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq. 
[20] Pretrial Procedure @^>747.1 
307A — 
307AV Pretrial Conference 
307Ak747 Order and Record or Report 
307Ak747.1 In General. 
Because the trial judge deals directly with the 
parties and the discovery process, he or she has great 
latitude in determining the most efficient and fair 
manner to conduct the court's business; as a result, 
trial courts have broad discretion in determining 
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants 
sanction. 
[21] Pretrial Procedure ®^747.1 
307A — 
307AV Pretrial Conference 
307Ak747 Order and Record or Report 
307Ak747.1 In General. 
Purpose behind a scheduling order is to allow the 
parties to properly prepare for trial and to save the 
parties from unnecessary expenses. 
[22] Appeal and Error <@=>1050.1(3.1) 
30 - -
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)10 Admission of Evidence 
30kl050 Prejudicial Effect in General 
30kl050.1 Evidence in General 
30kl050.1(3) Particular Actions or Issues, 
Evidence Relating to 
30kl050.1(3.1) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[22] Appeal and Error <©==> 1056.1(4.1) 
30 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J) 11 Exclusion of Evidence 
30kl056 Prejudicial Effect 
30kl056.1 In General 
30kl056.1(4) Particular Actions or Issues 
30kl056.1(4.1) In General. 
Any error in subcontractor's action to foreclose 
mechanics' liens against general contractor, in 
allowing witness to testify as subcontractor's expert 
regarding cost and adequacy of subcontractor's 
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAQ 
work and in limiting scope of testimony by general 
contractor's expert, was harmless, where Court of 
Appeals determined that subcontractor's unlicensed 
status precluded any recovery for HVAC work, and 
general contractor did not contest trial court's finding 
concerning cost of repairing defective HVAC work. 
U.C.A. 1953, 38-1-1 etseq., 58-55-604. 
[23] Appeal and Error <®=*1026 
30 - -
30XVI Review 
30XVI(J) Harmless Error 
30XVI(J)1 In General 
30kl025 Prejudice to Rights of Party as Ground 
of Review 
30kl026 In General. 
In order to prove entitlement to relief on appeal, 
appellant must show it was prejudiced or harmed by 
the trial court's action. 
[24] Appeal and Error <®=*907(4) 
30 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(G) Presumptions 
30k906 Facts or Evidence Not Shown by Record 
30k907 In General 
30k907(4) Failure to Set Forth All the 
Evidence. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2001 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
977 P.2d 518, A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating 
Court of Appeals would assume the accuracy of an 
uncontested factual finding by trial court. 
*520 Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, and Kevin P. 
McBride, Park City, for Appellant 
Steven B. Wall, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before WILKINS, P.J., and DAVIS and ORME, 
JJ. 
OPINION 
WILKINS, Presiding Judge: 
Tl 1 Appellant Aspen Construction (Aspen) appeals 
from a judgment awarding appellee A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing and Heating Whipple (Whipple) 
$3,943 for heating, venting, and air conditioning 
(HVAC) work it performed, and allowing Whipple to 
foreclose on three separate mechanics' liens. Aspen 
also appeals the trial court's decision to award 
Whipple $7,500 in attorney fees. We affirm in part, 
reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
BACKGROUND 
1 2 In 1993, Aspen, a general contractor, entered 
into an agreement with Whipple, a licensed plumbing 
contractor, to provide labor and materials for HVAC 
and plumbing work on three separate properties. 
When problems arose with the HVAC work on one of 
the properties, Aspen discharged Whipple and 
refused to remit any further payment until corrections 
were made. Whipple responded by filing mechanics' 
liens on all three properties and commencing three 
separate foreclosure actions that were later 
consolidated for purposes of trial. 
t 3 Before trial, Aspen filed a motion to dismiss the 
HVAC portion of Whipplefs mechanics' lien claim 
on the basis that Whipple lacked proper HVAC 
licensure as required by Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 
(1998). The trial court granted Aspen's motion, 
however, it invoked common law principles of equity 
*521 and determined that because Whipple had 
conferred a benefit upon Aspen, Whipple should be 
awarded the value of that benefit. The court further 
determined that there were deficiencies in Whipple's 
HVAC work and therefore, awarded Whipple the 
value of this work, less the cost Aspen would incur in 
correcting the deficiencies. 
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K 4 In June 1995, the trial court issued a scheduling 
order which required Whipple to disclose all 
witnesses by August 1, 1995, and respond to all 
discovery requests by August 31, 1995. On 
September 22, 1995, Aspen filed another motion to 
dismiss alleging Whipple had violated the scheduling 
order by failing to disclose witnesses and respond to 
Aspen's discovery requests. The trial court denied 
Aspen's motion, ruling that Aspen was not 
sufficiently prejudiced because Whipple provided 
Aspen with a complete list of witnesses it intended to 
call at trial. 
f 5 During trial, which took place in early October 
1995, the court heard evidence concerning the value 
of the work Whipple had performed on the various 
properties. Aspen also pursued its counterclaim 
seeking damages for the allegedly defective HVAC 
work. The trial did not conclude as scheduled and 
was continued until November. 
t 6 When the trial resumed in late November, the 
trial court allowed Ken Whipple to testify as an 
HVAC expert witness. Mr. Whipple, although not a 
licensed HVAC contractor during the earlier part of 
the trial, had obtained his HVAC license before the 
trial resumed. In response to Mr. Whipple's 
testimony, Aspen attempted to introduce the testimony 
of its expert regarding defects in the HVAC work. 
However, the trial court restricted the scope of this 
testimony because Aspen failed to list its expert as a 
potential expert witness. 
^ 7 At the close of trial, Aspen argued that Whipple 
had failed to meet the threshold requirement of 
establishing valid mechanics' liens. In its minute 
entry dated November 30, 1995, the trial court 
requested that Aspen prepare findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and a judgment, and concluded 
that, because neither party clearly prevailed, any 
award of attorney fees would be improper. 
% 8 Aspen's counsel prepared a monetary judgment 
in favor of Whipple along with proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. Whipple objected to the 
proposed findings because they did not include an 
order specifying foreclosure of the three liens and 
prepared separate findings which included an order of 
foreclosure. Aspen's counsel objected to Whipplefs 
proposed findings, arguing there was insufficient 
evidence to support a foreclosure order. Whipple 
then filed a motion to reopen the case to take 
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additional evidence regarding its compliance with the 
mechanics' lien foreclosure statute. The trial court 
granted Whipple's motion "in the interests of 
justice." 
T[ 9 On September 19, 1996, the trial court held a 
supplemental hearing and received evidence of the 
mechanics' liens and also took under advisement 
Whipple's request for reconsideration of an award of 
attorney fees. Whipple asserted that now having 
"prevailed" it was entitled to attorney fees as the 
"prevailing party." Aspen also requested attorney 
fees, arguing it prevailed at the outset on the claim for 
defective HVAC work. On March 31, 1997, the trial 
court entered formal findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and a judgment awarding Whipple $3,943 for 
its HVAC work. The trial court also denied Aspen's 
fee request, instead awarding Whipple $7,500 in 
attorney fees. In addition, the trial court allowed 
Whipple to foreclose on the three mechanics' liens 
and valued a portion of Whipple's plumbing work for 
sewer laterals at $3,200. This appeal followed. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
[1][2] J 10 Aspen raises several arguments on 
appeal. First, Aspen contends Utah Code Ann. § 
58-55-604 (1998) barred Whipple from maintaining 
this action and that the trial court erred in granting 
Whipple recovery on equitable grounds. This issue 
turns on the trial court's interpretation of a statute, 
which we review for correctness, without deference to 
the trial court's conclusions. See Butterfield Lumber, 
Inc. v. Peterson Mortgage Corp., 815 P.2d 1330, 
1332 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Second, Aspen argues the 
trial court abused its discretion in granting *522 
Whipplefs motion to reopen on grounds not provided 
in Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
"Consideration of a motion to grant a new trial or 
open a judgment for additional evidence under ... [ 
Rule 59] is a matter left to the discretion of the trial 
judge, and that decision will be reversed only if the 
judge has abused that discretion by acting 
unreasonably." Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 81 
(Utah Ct.App. 1989) (citation omitted). 
[3] [4] [5] 1 11 Third, Aspen claims there is 
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's 
determination that Whipple adequately complied with 
section 38-1-7 of the mechanic's lien statute or its 
valuation of Whipple's plumbing work for sewer 
laterals. "We review the trial court's findings of fact 
for clear error and its legal conclusions for 
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correctness." Smith v. Batchelor, 934 P.2d 643, 646 
(Utah 1997). Fourth, Aspen argues the trial court 
erred in denying its request for attorney fees and 
failed to properly allocate Whipple's attorney fee 
award according to its underlying claims. Whether 
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question 
of law, which we review for correctness. See 
Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496, 499 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1992). Finally, Aspen argues the trial court 
abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss 
Whipple's case for noncompliance with the 
scheduling order, permitting Ken Whipple to testify 
as an HVAC expert, and in limiting the testimony of 
Aspen's expert witness. Trial courts have broad 
discretion in managing the cases before them and we 
will not interfere with their decisions absent an abuse 
of discretion. See Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande 
W. R.R. Co., 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct.App.1992) 
ANALYSIS 
1. Licensing Requirements 
[6] \ 12 Aspen contends that Whipple's failure to 
comply with the licensing requirements of section 
58-55-604, precludes Whipple from maintaining this 
action and that the trial court erred in allowing 
Whipple to recover on equitable grounds. We agree. 
1f 13 Section 58-55-604 of the Utah Code provides 
that "[n]o contractor may ... commence or maintain 
any action ... for collection of compensation for 
performing any act for which a license is required ... 
without alleging and proving that he [or she] was a 
properly licensed contractor when the contract sued 
upon was entered into, and when the alleged cause of 
action arose." Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604 (1998). 
Our Legislature has determined that proper licensure 
is of paramount importance and that if a contractor 
performs work without the requisite license, it should 
be denied compensation. Thus, the statute serves the 
dual purpose of protecting the public from 
incompetent contractors, while sanctioning contractors 
who fail to obtain proper licensure. 
K 14 However, this statutory bar is not without 
exception. We have recognized that the statutory bar 
"does not preclude the application of the previous 
common law exceptions to the general rule of non-
recovery. " Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 
801 P.2d 163, 169 (Utah Ct.App. 1990). Thus, a 
court addressing the issue of whether an unlicensed 
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contractor may maintain an action for quantum meruit 
must: (1) determine whether the contractor is 
properly licensed or whether its status as an 
unlicensed contractor places it within the purview of 
section 58-55-604; and (2) determine whether the 
contractor is entitled to relief under common law 
principles despite its non-licensure and support that 
conclusion with appropriate findings of fact. In other 
words, if the court concludes the claim falls within 
the purview of section 58-55-604, but the common 
law exceptions apply, then the statutory bar will not 
preclude suit. However, if the court determines 
section 58-55-604 applies but the common law 
exceptions are inapplicable, then section 58-55-604 
absolutely bars the action. 
[7] TI 15 Here, the trial court stated "[s]ection 
58-55-604 U.C.A. is controlling in this case .... [and 
Whipple's] failure to comply with the statute is 
sufficient grounds for the Motion to Dismiss to be 
granted as a matter of law...." The trial court then 
proceeded to allow Whipple to maintain its action 
below and ultimately recover under "principles of 
equity." The court failed to adequately explain 
which common law rules, if any, it applied in this 
case, or support its *523 decision with appropriate 
findings of fact. Nevertheless, because of our 
obligation to affirm the trial court on any available 
basis, see White v. Deseelhorst, 879 P.2d 1371, 1376 
(Utah 1994), we address whether any of the common 
law exceptions allow Whipple to maintain its action. 
[8] [9] K 16 The Utah common law exceptions are 
premised on the theory that rigid insistence on proper 
licensure is unnecessary as long as the public is 
otherwise protected from the harm the statute is 
designed to prevent. See American Rural Cellular v. 
Systems Communication Corp., 890 P.2d 1035, 1040 
(Utah Ct.App. 1995). Utah courts have generally 
allowed unlicensed contractors to recover for quantum 
meruit in four instances where, notwithstanding the 
contractor's lack of proper licensure, the licensing 
statute's purpose is met. 
T 17 First, unlicensed contractors have been allowed 
to recover when the party for whom the work is to be 
done possesses skill or expertise in the field. See id. 
Here, there is no evidence showing Aspen was 
knowledgeable or skilled in HVAC work. We cannot 
infer from Aspen's general contracting status that it 
possessed special skill or expertise sufficient to 
protect itself from incompetent HVAC work. See 
Wilderness Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 
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766, 768 (Utah 1985) (rejecting unlicensed 
contractor's argument that contracting party's 
reservation of plumbing work for itself rendered it 
knowledgeable in that field). 
f 18 Second, an unlicensed contractor may recover 
if the work it performed was supervised by a licensed 
contractor. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P. 2d at 
1040. The cases in which this principle has been 
applied have all involved supervision or labor by a 
properly licensed third party thereby protecting the 
original contracting party from the unlicensed 
contractor's incompetence. See Kinkella v. Baugh, 
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983) (refusing to apply 
statutory bar where unlicensed contractor was 
supervised by licensed contractor and therefore, 
original contracting party "received whatever 
protection is afforded by compliance with the 
licensing statute"); Motivated Management Ini'l v. 
Finney, 604 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1979) (allowing 
unlicensed contractor to recover where "at least part 
of the construction was performed by a licensed 
contractor" because the licensed party's involvement 
adequately protected original contracting party); 
Fillmore Prods, v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 
P. 2d 687, 690 (Utah 1977) (providing when general 
contractor hired unlicensed subcontractor to provide 
plumbing work, unlicensed subcontractor could 
recover because entire project was supervised by 
licensed project engineer who ensured job was done 
properly). In this case, Aspen did not have the added 
protection of a properly licensed contractor to ensure 
the HVAC work was adequately completed. Instead, 
Whipple performed the work on its own without the 
supervision of someone with proper licensure. Thus, 
we conclude Whipplefs HVAC work was not 
adequately supervised to invoke this exception to the 
statutory bar. 
1 19 Third, if the reason a contractor fails to obtain 
proper licensure is minor and does not undermine its 
ability to perform its work, the unlicensed contractor 
may recover. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P. 2d 
at 1040; see also Loader v. Scott Constr. Corp., 681 
P.2d 1227, 1229-30 (Utah 1984) (permitting recovery 
where contractor mistakenly, but in good faith, 
believed he could perform work under partner's 
license); Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800, 804-05 
(Utah 1979) (allowing recovery where otherwise 
properly qualified contractor mistakenly allowed 
license to lapse for nonpayment of renewal fee). 
Here, the record shows Whipple has provided HVAC 
work for many years without proper licensure. 
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Although Mr. Whipple claims he believed in good 
faith his general plumbing contractors license allowed 
him to install HVAC forced air heating systems, the 
fact is, it did not. Until trial in this case, Whipple 
had never complied with licensing requirements 
showing he possessed the technical competence or 
financial qualifications for licensure. Equally 
important, the trial court heard extensive evidence 
about the inadequacies of Whipple's HVAC work 
and ultimately concluded the HVAC work was 
deficient. Based on the foregoing, we conclude 
Whipple's failure to obtain proper HVAC licensure 
•524 precludes application of this common law 
exception. 
K 20 Finally, courts have considered whether the 
contracting party relied on the subcontractor's 
representations that he was properly licensed and 
whether the subcontractor has posted a performance 
bond. See American Rural Cellular, 890 P. 2d at 
1041. Here, Whipple actively solicited and engaged 
in HVAC work for more than sixteen years. As a 
result, Whipple implicitly represented to its 
customers that it was properly licensed and qualified 
to perform such work. In addition, although 
Whipple claims it maintained liability insurance to 
protect its customers, Whipple has offered no 
evidence of a performance bond. Therefore, we 
conclude Whipple does not fall within this final 
exception to the statutory bar. 
f 21 In sum, we have determined the trial court 
properly applied section 58-55-604 to this case 
because Whipple performed HVAC work without 
proper licensure. We also conclude, however, that 
the trial court erred in allowing Whipple to recover 
for HVAC work under "principles of equity" because 
the common law exceptions to section 58-55-604 are 
inapplicable in this case. We therefore reverse the 
trial court's ruling regarding this issue, and vacate 
any award to Whipple based on the HVAC work. 
2. Motion to Reopen 
[10] K 22 Aspen next argues the trial court abused 
its discretion in granting Whipplefs motion to reopen 
"in the interests of justice." We disagree. 
If 23 The Utah Supreme Court has stated that it lies 
within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant a 
motion to reopen for the purpose of taking additional 
testimony after the case has been submitted but prior 
to entry of judgment. See Lewis v. Porter, 556 P. 2d 
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496, 497 (Utah 1976). Furthermore, the court has 
directed lower courts to consider such a motion "in 
light of all the circumstances and grant or deny it in 
the interest of fairness and substantial justice." Id. 
f 24 Here, the trial judge stated "[I am g]oing to 
grant the motion to reopen and in the interests of 
justice, I think there [are] some glaring 
misunderstandings in the presentation of the evidence; 
and the Court is going to allow the plaintiff to re-open 
as requested in their motion." (Emphasis added.) In 
addition, the mechanics' lien claims in this case were 
actually litigated and the court granted Whipple's 
motion to address the parties' basic disagreement over 
the validity of the liens at issue. Testimony of the 
filing, service, and content of the liens had already 
been received into evidence. The documents sought 
to be introduced by the motion to reopen were 
exhibits to Whipple's complaint served on Aspen to 
commence the actions. Nothing unexpected was 
allowed into evidence as a result of the motion to 
reopen being granted. The trial court's decision did 
not deprive Aspen of a full and fair consideration of 
the issues regarding the mechanics' liens. Therefore, 
we conclude the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion. 
3. Compliance with Mechanics' Lien Statute and 
Value of Lateral Work 
[11] f 25 Aspen also argues there is insufficient 
evidence to support two factual determinations by the 
trial court: (1) that Whipple complied with section 
38-1-7 of the mechanics' lien statute; and (2) that the 
value of Whipple's plumbing work for sewer laterals 
was $3,200. In contesting the trial court's ultimate 
conclusions regarding Whipple's compliance with the 
mechanic's lien statute and the value of its plumbing 
work, Aspen must show either that the conclusions 
are incorrect given the findings or that the "factual 
findings underlying ... [the trial court's] 
determination^] are clearly erroneous." Cellcom v. 
Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 189 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). On appeal, Aspen attacks the 
findings themselves. 
[12] | 26 To challenge the trial court's findings, 
Aspen must "marshal the evidence in support of the 
findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be against the clear weight of the 
evidence[,]" thus making them clearly erroneous. Id. 
(citations omitted). We will uphold the trial court's 
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findings of fact if the party *525 challenging the 
findings fails to appropriately marshal all the evidence 
supporting the findings. See Allred v. Brown, 893 
P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah Ct.App. 1995). 
[13] % 27 Here, Aspen has simply failed to meet this 
burden. It did not marshal all the evidence supporting 
the trial court's findings or show that, viewing the 
evidence in a light favorable to the court's rulings, the 
findings were clearly erroneous. Aspen ignores, for 
example, the fact that Whipple offered copies of the 
mechanics' liens into evidence which the court 
accepted into evidence as being authenticated 
documents. Aspen also disregards the extensive 
evidence presented at trial regarding the value of 
Whipple's plumbing work. Rather, Aspen merely 
restates those facts favorable to its position or in the 
alternative argues there was insufficient evidence to 
support the trial court's findings. 
f 28 Although Aspen maintains it adequately 
marshaled the evidence in an addendum to its brief, 
the Utah Supreme Court has denounced the practice 
of marshaling evidence in an appendix stating that 
M[t]his does not comply with the requirement to 
marshal evidence. It is improper for counsel to 
attempt to enlarge the page limit of briefing by 
placing critical facts in appendices." DeBry v. 
Cascade Enters., 879 P.2d 1353, 1360 a 3 (Utah 
1994). Worse yet, the addendum does not include a 
properly focused marshaling of the evidence 
supporting particular findings under attack, but rather 
is a comprehensive catalogue of all testimony in the 
record. Thus, we must assume the evidence 
supported the findings underlying the trial court's 
determination that Whipple complied with section 
38-1-7 of the mechanics' lien statute and that it 
adequately valued Whipple's plumbing work. 
Accordingly, Aspen's argument fails. 
T 29 We note however, that the trial court's 
Conclusion of Law No. 5 includes Whipple's HVAC 
work as part of the order of foreclosure. As 
previously discussed, Whipple is precluded by 
section 58-55-604 from recovering for its HVAC 
work. Thus, to the extent Conclusion of Law No. 5 
is inconsistent with this opinion, it, and any part of 
the judgment that follows therefrom, is vacated. 
4. Attorney Fees 
[14] f 30 Aspen next asserts the trial court erred in 
denying its request for attorney fees arguing that 
because it prevailed against Whipple on the HVAC 
portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim, it is the 
prevailing party. In light of our disposition of the 
preceding issues, this contention may have merit. 
f 31 The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in 
any action brought to enforce any lien under this 
chapter the successful party shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the 
court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action." 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-18 (1997). In this case, 
although the trial court initially granted Aspen's 
motion to dismiss the HVAC portion of Whipple's 
mechanics' lien claim because of improper licensure, 
it went on to award Whipple the value of the work 
performed on Aspen's property. Based in part on this 
finding, the trial court concluded that Whipple was 
the prevailing party and entitled to an award of 
attorney fees. However, this conclusion may be 
erroneous in light of our determination that section 
58-55-604 precludes VHiipple from recovering for its 
HVAC work. Based upon our review of the record, 
it appears the HVAC claim was the single most 
important issue in this case and Aspen, having fully 
prevailed on the HVAC claim in this appeal, may 
now be entitled to prevailing party status under 
section 38-1-18. If on remand the trial court 
determines Aspen is the prevailing party (FN1) under 
section 38-1-18, then Aspen must be given the 
opportunity to present evidence regarding attorney 
fees incurred in pursuing its claim. We therefore 
remand this issue to the trial court for a 
redetermination of the attorney fees award consistent 
with this opinion and the entry of findings necessary 
to support the revised award. 
*526 [15][16][17] H 32 Aspen also asserts the trial 
court erred in failing to properly allot Whipple's 
attorney fees award according to its underlying 
claims. We agree. The Utah Supreme Court has 
required a party seeking attorney fees to allocate its 
request for fees according to its underlying claim. 
See Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). 
The party must differentiate between the fees and 
time expended for "(1) successful claims for which 
there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, (2) 
unsuccessful claims for which there would have been 
an entitlement to attorney fees had the claims been 
successful, and (3) claims for which there is no 
entitlement for attorney fees." Cottonwood Mall Co. 
v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992). This 
requirement also obligates the trial court to make 
findings which closely resemble the requesting party's 
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allocation of fees on each claim. See Foote, 962 P.2d 
at 55. Finally, the trial court must clearly identify 
and document the factors it considered dispositive in 
calculating the award. See id. Absent such an 
allocation and documentation, this court cannot 
adequately review the trial court's decision. See id. at 
57. 
[18] If 33 Here, Whipple submitted an affidavit 
requesting attorney fees. However, the affidavit did 
not differentiate between the work done that was 
subject to a fee award and work that was not. The 
court acknowledged that it "had difficulty, based on [ 
Whipple's] attorney fee affidavit, in separating the 
amount of time involved with the mechanics' liens as 
opposed to the amount of time spent on other 
matters." Although Whipple's failure to apportion 
attorney fees was a sufficient basis for the trial court 
to deny its fee request, see Utah Farm Prod. Credit 
Ass'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981), the court 
went on to state that "in consideration of the 
complexity of the case and the total amount involved, 
plaintiff should be awarded ... $7,500 in attorney 
fees...." 
K 34 Because the trial court failed to properly 
categorize the fee request or detail the factors it 
considered in computing the award, see Foote, 962 
P.2d at 56 (concluding "[w]here the parties' 
evidentiary submissions in support of a request for 
attorney fees are deficient, so will be the court's 
evaluation of those fees"), we reverse and remand the 
issue of fees to the trial court for a redetermination of 
the prevailing party, and, based on that determination, 
an award of attorney fees consistent with this opinion. 
5. Scheduling Order and Expert Testimony 
U 35 Finally, Aspen contends the trial court abused 
its discretion by failing to dismiss Whipple's case for 
noncompliance with the scheduling order, permitting 
Ken Whipple to testify as an HVAC expert, and in 
limiting the scope of testimony provided by Aspen's 
expert witness. 
A. Scheduling Order 
[19] [20] [21] 1 36 Aspen asserts the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing Whipple to proceed 
with its case despite its failure to comply with the trial 
court's scheduling order. Because the trial judge 
deals directly with the parties and the discovery 
process, he or she has great latitude in determining 
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the most efficient and fair manner to conduct the 
court's business. See Utah Dep't of Transp. v. 
Osguthorpe, 892 P. 2d 4, 6 (Utah 1995)! As a result, 
trial courts have broad discretion in determining 
whether a violation of a scheduling order warrants 
sanction. See id. The purpose behind a scheduling 
order is to allow the parties to properly prepare for 
trial and to save the parties from unnecessary 
expenses. See DeBry, 879 P.2d at 1361. 
1 37 Here, the trial court determined that although 
Whipple failed to adequately comply with the 
scheduling order, Aspen was provided with sufficient 
information to prepare for trial. The court noted that 
in Whipple's response to Aspen's interrogatories, 
Whipple had specified the witnesses it was going to 
call at trial and the substance of their testimony. 
Thus, the trial court determined Aspen was not 
prejudiced by Whipple's violation of the scheduling 
order. Because Aspen obtained the information 
necessary to adequately prepare for trial, we conclude 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing 
to dismiss Whipple's case. 
•527. B. Expert Testimony 
[22] f 38 Aspen also asserts the trial court abused 
its discretion in allowing Ken Whipple to testify as an 
expert regarding the cost and adequacy of Whipple's 
HVAC work and in limiting the scope of testimony 
provided by Aspen's expert witness. We conclude 
that any errors in this regard were harmless. 
[23] [24] U 39 In order to prove its entitlement to 
relief on appeal, Aspen must show it was prejudiced 
or harmed by the trial court's action. See Astill v. 
Clark, 956 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Utah App. 1998). 
Because we have determined section 58-55-604 
precludes Whipple from maintaining an action to 
recover the cost of its HVAC work, the expert 
testimony regarding the valuation of Whipple's 
HVAC work is irrelevant. In other words, the cost 
Whipple incurred in performing the HVAC work is 
no longer an issue. Furthermore, Aspen does not 
contest the court's finding concerning the cost Aspen 
will incur in repairing the defective HVAC work and 
therefore, we assume its accuracy. See Cellcom, 939 
P.2d at 189. Thus, the trial court's rulings regarding 
the admission of expert testimony could not have 
harmed or prejudiced Aspen in any way and 
therefore, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this 
ground. 
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CONCLUSION 
K 40 Because Whipple failed to comply with the 
licensure requirements of section 58-55-604 and none 
of the common law exceptions to the statutory bar 
apply, Whipple is precluded from recovering for its 
HVAC work Further, we have determined the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in granting 
Whipple's Rule 59 motion "in the interests of 
justice " Also, because Aspen failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings 
regarding Whipple's compliance with the mechanics' 
lien statute and the value of Whipple's sewer lateral 
work, we decline to disturb those findings We also 
remand the issue of attorney fees to the trial court for 
a redetermination of the prevailing party and a proper 
allocation of attorney fees to that party Finally, 
Aspen was not prejudiced by the trial court's actions 
in failing to dismiss Whipple's case for 
noncompliance with the scheduling order, permitting 
Ken Whipple to testify as a HVAC expert, or in 
limiting the scope of testimony provided by Aspen's 
expert witness 
% 41 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion 
1 42 WE CONCUR JAMES Z DAVIS, Judge, 
and GREGORY K ORME, Judge 
(FN1) On remand, the trial court may find helpful 
the guidance on this issue offered by Mountain 
States Broad. Co. v. Neale, 783 P 2d 551, 555-58 
(Utah Ct App 1989) 
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